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Land Reform in the People's Republic of
China: Auctioning Rights to Wasteland
TIM HANSTAD* & LI PING** ..
I. BACKGROUND
A. Recent Developments in the People's Republic of China's Rural
Reform
Reforms in the People's Republic of China (PRC) since the
late 1970s have produced important changes in the PRC's rural
land system. Between 1979 and 1983, after more than twenty years
of collective farming,' Chinese collective farms distributed land use
rights to individual households, thereby creating a nation of family
2farms. Collective farms distributed the land on an egalitarian ba-
sis, giving each household an amount of land proportional to fam-
ily size.3 Each household would use its land independently, but the
collective retained land ownership.
4
Although the family farm system created by the 1979-1983
decollectivization has generally remained intact, several significant
* Executive Director, Rural Development Institute; Lecturer, University of Wash-
ington School of Law. J.D., University of Washington; L.L.M., University of Washington.
** Research Consultant, Rural Development Institute. M.A., Public Policy, Seattle
University.
*** We gratefully acknowledge a grant from the Lebrun Foundation, Buffalo, NY,
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1. Collective ownership of rural land began in 1956 when the PRC established the
Advanced Agricultural Producer's Cooperatives, which "owned" the rural land through-
out the PRC. See Wenfang Zhang & Jack Makeham, Rural Land Use in China, 68 LAND
ECON. 139 (1992). Accordingly, the Chinese Constitution strictly prohibited any person
or organization from attempting to privately buy, sell, or lease rural land. See XIANFA
[Constitution] art. 10, cl. 4 (1982); see also Zhang & Makeham, supra.




Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L.J.
developments have occurred since 1983. Originally, collective
farms gave land to most peasant households for a term of at most
three years. In 1984, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Central
Committee issued Rural Work Document No. 1, urging local offi-
cials as follows:
prolong the time period of the contracted land, encourage the
peasants to increase their investment to foster the fertility of
the soil and practice intensive operation. In general, the time
period of the contracted land should be more than 15 years.
Projects with a long production cycle and of development na-
ture, such as fruit trees, woods and forests, denuded hills, and
wasteland, should have a longer period.'
In November 1993, the CCP Central Committee stated that "the
term for contracting land may be extended" for another thirty
years after the original fifteen-year right expires.6 In April 1995,
the State Council reiterated the 1993 decision on the extension of
land rights.7 The 1995 directive also protected the new thirty-year
use rights from readjustment based on changes in household size.8
These central government policies have focused on farmers'
use rights to the PRC's ninety-three million hectares of arable
land.9 In addition to this arable land, the PRC has at least thirty-
three million hectares of uncultivated, but reclaimable, land, which
is categorized as "wasteland."'0 During the 1980s decollectiviza-
5. See ROY L. PROSTERMAN ET AL., RURAL DEV. INST., RDI REPORTS ON
FOREIGN AID & DEVELOPMENT #85, REFORMING CHINA'S RURAL LAND SYSTEM: A
FIELD REPORT (1994).
6. Decision of the CCP Central Committee on Some Issues Concerning the Estab-
lishment of a Socialist Market Economic Structure, 14th Central Comm., 3d Plen. Sess.,
art. 31, reprinted in Chinese Communist Party Outlines Plan for Socialist Market Econ-
omy, BBC SUMMARY WORLD BROADCASTS, Nov. 18, 1993, available in LEXIS, News
Library, Bbcswb File.
7. See Jane Macartney, China Extends Farmers' Land Contracts, Reuters World
Service, Apr. 20, 1995, available in LEXIS, News Library, Reuwld File.
8. Collective farms initially distributed land to farmers in proportion to their house-
hold size subject to future readjustment if the household size changed. See Zhang &
Makeham, supra note 1, at 139. Our fieldwork revealed that the possibility of land read-
justment undermined farmers' tenure security and their willingness to make long-term
land improvements.
9. For a discussion of reforms and recommended changes concerning arable land in
the PRC, see ROY L. PROSTERMAN ET AL., supra note 5, at 8.
10. Chinese officials estimate that the PRC has 33 million hectares of reclaimable
wasteland that is transformable into arable land. This land is primarily located in the
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tion, the collective did not distribute most of this wasteland to in-
dividual households." Little of the -distributed wasteland has been
developed because farmers felt that the use rights were either too
short or uncertain. 12
Developing this wasteland for agricultural production and
forestation holds tremendous economic and ecological potential.
Due to industrialization and urbanization, the PRC's relatively
small amount of arable land is shrinking each year. 3 The shrinking
arable land base has caused some observers to question the PRC's
ability to continue feeding its population.'4  Wasteland provides
the potential to reverse the decline in the availability of arable
land.
Despite this tremendous potential, the Chinese government
has not addressed wasteland development in its policy-making
agenda. Due in part to the absence of uniform central government
guidelines, various regions throughout the PRC have conducted
experiments with wasteland use rights, including auctions. Unlike
the egalitarian distribution of arable land, the auctioning system
involves villages 5 selling use rights to collective-owned wasteland
through a competitive bidding process. The use rights to auc-
northeastern and northwestern parts of the PRC, in the Yellow and Huai River deltas,
and in the middle and lower reaches of the Yangzi River. Officials also estimate that the
PRC has another 133 million hectares of barren hills, beaches, slopes, and gullies that may
be developed to grow fruit trees, medicinal herbs, and other cash crops. See Interview by
Wen Wei Po with Jiang Chunyun, Vice-Premier (Mar. 21, 1995), reprinted in The Leader-
ship: Wen Wei Po Interview with Vice-Premier Jiang Chunyun on Agriculture, BBC
SUMMARY WORLD BROADCASTS, Apr. 4, 1995, available in LEXIS, News Library,
Bbcwb File..
11. See Zhang & Makeham, supra note 1, at 139.
12. See id.
13. See Interview by Wen Wei Po with Jiang Chunyun, supra note 10, reprinted in The
Leadership: Wen Wei Po Interview with Vice-Premier Jiang Chunyun on Agriculture,
BBC SUMMARY WORLD BROADCASTS, Apr. 4, 1995, available in LEXIS, News Library,
Bbcwb File.
14. See id
15. Under the collective system prior to 1980, communes were further divided into
brigades and production teams. See PROSTERMAN ET AL., supra note 5, at 6. In most
Chinese localities, some collective administration still exists at both levels. See id. Al-
though the brigade and the production team have been renamed the administrative vil-
lage and natural village respectively, most farmers still use the terms "brigade" and
"production team." See id. The production team or natural village administration has
been eliminated in some regions, including the Luliang prefecture of Shanxi Province,
where we conducted fieldwork on wasteland distribution. This Article uses the terms
.'village" and "brigade" interchangeably.
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tioned wasteland are typically much longer and more secure than
use rights to arable land.
B. Luliang Prefecture16
Luliang began sporadically auctioning wasteland in the early
1980s, formalized wasteland auctions in 1992, and was the first pre-
fecture in the PRC to adopt a prefecture-wide program of waste-
land auctions. Situated in Shanxi Province along the Yellow
River, about 500 kilometers southwest of Beijing, Luliang is one of
the PRC's poorest areas, with an average annual income of 735
yuan (U.S.$90). Arable land accounts for fifty-four percent of
Luliang's total land area with wasteland accounting for thirty-
seven percent of its total land area.
1. Luliang Documents and Briefing
In June 1995, with assistance from the Ministry of Agricul-
ture's Research Center of Rural Economy, we conducted field re-
search on wasteland auctions in Luliang.17 Before we interviewed
farmers in the field, Luliang officials briefed us on wasteland auc-
tions and also provided us with a compilation of published policy
documents on wasteland auction issued by the Prefecture Party
Committee and various county governments. A summary of the
official briefing and the published policy documents follows.
2. Wasteland Auctions in Luliang
a. Types of Wasteland and Use Rights
Official Luliang documents divide auctionable wasteland into
four categories: waste slope, waste mountains, waste gullies, and
16. A prefecture is the largest political subdivision below the province level.
17. Since 1987, we have conducted seven rounds of fieldwork in the PRC's rural land
system, including fieldwork in ten provinces: Sichuan, Fujian, Zhejiang, Jiangsu, Anhui,
Hainan, Hebei, Guizhou, and Shanxi; and two provincial-level municipalities: Beijing
Municipality and Tianjin Municipality. In addition to research on wasteland auctions, this
fieldwork has included land system experiments in Meitan and Pingdu Counties and in
Guizhou and Shangdon Provinces.
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waste riverbeds-collectively called the "four wastes."' 8 All land
classified in the "four wastes" is reclaimable. 9 Wasteland is di-
vided into parcels of geographic units called "liu yu," which en-
compass the entire land area between natural borders formed by
streams or riverbeds within the brigade borders." Surface use
rights and attachments, including use rights to sporadic plots of ar-
able land within a liu yu, are typically auctioned as one unit.2" The
State, however, retains mining rights to the land.22
b. Disposing of Wasteland: Auctions and Sales
Villages sell use rights to wasteland either through closed
auctions, open auctions, or negotiated sales. Only farmers from
the village that owns the auctioned land may bid in closed auc-
tions.23 In open auctions, people living outside the village may also
offer bids.24 Villages use negotiated sales only when the wasteland
for sale is unattractive or when a farmer who is willing to pay for
longer use rights has already contracted the wasteland.25
Luliang villages generally use closed auctions when villagers
show interest in bidding on the land.26 If villagers do not offer bids,
village leaders hold open auctions and invite outsiders.27 Some
villages conduct open auctions when collective officials believe
outsiders are willing to bid significantly higher than the villagers.28
In open auctions, bidders may be individuals, institutions, farmers,
or city dwellers.2 9 Government employees may not, however, par-
18. See ZHONG GONG LULIANG Di WEI WEN JIAN #14 [CHINESE COMMUNIST
PARTY OF LULIANG DOCUMENT #14] (1993) [hereinafter DOCUMENT #14], in HUANG
Tu DI DE XIN XIWANG [NEW HOPE OF THE YELLOW EARTH] 5,5 (1994).
19. See id.
20. See ZHONG GONG LULIANG Di WEI WEN JIAN #15 [CHINESE COMMUNIST
PARTY OF LULIANG DOCUMENT #15] (1992) [hereinafter DOCUMENT #15], in NEW
HOPE OF THE YELLOW EARTH, supra note 18, at 1, 2.
21. See id.
22. See id.
23. See DOCUMENT #14, supra note 18, at 6-7.
24. See id.
25. See id.
26. See DOCUMENT #15, supra note 20, at 2.
27. See id.
28. Although Luliang officials acknowledged the existence of such practices, the lit-
erature that they provided to us failed to mention any such practices.
29. See DOCUMENT #14, supra note 18, at 7.
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ticipate in any wasteland auctions. °
A village starts the auction process by organizing an auction
leading group, which is comprised of village cadre and representa-
tives.3 This auction leading group decides which wasteland parcels
will be auctioned and sets a starting bidding price. The group's
decisions, however, are subject to the villagers' approval." The
auction leading group also provides notice of the auction and in-
formation on the wasteland parcels.33 It places this notice and in-
formation on the village bulletin board and elsewhere throughout
the village approximately one month before the auction date. 4 On
the auction date, township35 cadre assist with the auction, which
takes place in the village itself.36
Depending on the land's desirability, villages usually auction
or sell use rights to wasteland for a term ranging between 50 and
100 years. 7 The Luliang Prefecture Committee of the CCP issued
Document Number 15 of 1992, which provides that a current con-
tractor has the right to extend the contract by making an addi-
tional payment to the collective landowner. The document fails,
however, to provide specific details about the amount of payment
or the length of the contract extension. Moreover, inconsistencies
between wasteland use contracts and wasteland certificates create
39more uncertainty about the contractor's right to renew.
Following auctions or sales, the contractor signs a land use
contract with the production brigade, which is the collective land-
owner.40 After signing the contract, the parties must notarize the
30. "Government employees are allowed to purchase wasteland, but only if they
sever employment ties with government institutions." Id.




35. After decollectivization in the PRC, the government abolished communes and
replaced them with townships as the basic unit of government administration in the coun-
tryside.
36. See DOCUMENT #15, supra note 20, at 2.
37. "The term period of auctioned wasteland shall be generally within 50 to 100
years." Id. In practice, however, use rights with shorter terms such as 30 years are also
sold and auctioned.
38. See id.
39. See infra note 82 and accompanying text.
40. See DOCUMENT#14, supra note 18, at 7.
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contract at the township rural economic management station.4' In
addition to the land use contract, the county's land management
bureau issues the contractor a land use certificate indicating the
user's name, the land's location, size, and the use right term.42 The
certificate also bears the seal of the county government and the
county land management bureau.43
Wasteland use contracts and land certificates are generally
uniform throughout the county. A typical contract contains the
following provisions: (1) specific term period, with the starting
and expiration dates; (2) the parties' rights and obligations; (3)
terms of reward and penalty; (4) descriptive location of the land
and its attachments; (5) criteria of required improvement; and (6)
notarization by the township rural economic management station.
4
In addition, the parties must sign four copies of the contract.45
These copies are distributed to the county's land management bu-
reau, the township administration, the brigade, and the individual
contractor.46
c. Wasteland Rights, Benefits, and Restrictions
Wasteland use rights may be inherited as long as the transfer
does not include compensation. Although wasteland contractors
have the general right to transfer their use rights to other private
parties for compensation,47 the prefecture imposes two restrictions
on such transfers. First, contractors may not transfer wasteland for
a profit within two years of securing the bid.4 Second, contractors
may not profit from a waste land transfer until they improve and
41. See DOCUMENT #15, supra note 20, at 3.
42. Luliang's government attaches great importance to the uniformity and necessity
of the written contract and the land certificate. -According to article 4 of Document
Number 14 of 1993, "no excuse shall be given for refusing or delaying to sign contracts.
Oral contracts and contracts without notarization shall not be acceptable .... 'Four
Wastes' contract must be printed in a format that is uniform throughout the county ... 
DOCUMENT #14, supra note 18, at 7-8.
43. See id.
44. See id.
45. See DOCUMENT #15, supra note 20, at 3.
46. See id.
47. See id.
48. See ZHONG GONG LULIANG Di WE[ WEN JIAN #22 [CHINESE COMMUNIST
PARTY OF LULIANG DOCUMENT #22] (1994) [hereinafter DOCUMENT #221, in NEW
HOPE OF THE YELLOW EARTH, supra note 18, at 14, 16.
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develop at least thirty percent of the land.49 In addition to these
restrictions, wasteland contractors must file and record all trans-
fers with the village.50
The prefecture government has issued policy guidelines re-
garding land use that restrict the land to agricultural or agricul-
turally related purposes, such as fruit processing.51 Further, if the
contractor has not improved or developed at least thirty percent of
the land within three years of obtaining the use rights, the brigade
may take back the land without compensation.5 1 Wasteland con-
tractors may build structures on the land, but these structures must
be for housing, developing animal husbandry, or processing side-
line agricultural products such as fruits and herb medicines." Al-
though contractors may plant trees or grass on the wasteland, they
may not cultivate annual crops on a slope greater than twenty-five
degrees. 4
Both the prefecture and the various counties offer tax benefits
and subsidies to wasteland contractors. Forest and fruit tree prod-
ucts grown on wasteland are exempt from the agricultural specialty
tax for a period ranging from ten to twenty years.5 Wasteland that
is transformed into cultivated land is typically exempt from obliga-
tory state purchase, state agricultural tax, and collective taxes and
fees for twenty years. 6 Wasteland contractors may deduct each
49. See id.
50. See DOCUMENT #15, supra note 20, at 3.
51. The prefecture's regulations on land use restrictions contain some ambiguities.
Document Number 15 of 1992, which the Luliang Prefecture Committee of the CCP is-
sued, provides that non-agricultural businesses may use wasteland as long as they "are
approved by the co-op economic organization of administrative village," implying the
possibility of non-agricultural usage of wasteland. Id. On the other hand, Document
Number 22 of 1994, which the Luliang Prefecture Committee of the CCP also issued, bans
users from developing wasteland for non-agricultural purposes by stating that "four
wastes can only be used for agricultural development. Non-agricultural operations on
purchased 'four wastes' such as mining for coal, building rocks and other mineral re-
sources are forbidden." DOCUMENT #22, supra note 48, at 16. We found in at least one
case that auctioned wasteland was being used as a sand quarry. The bidding price for
such wasteland was much higher than for wasteland used for agricultural purposes.
52. In Lanxian County of Luliang Prefecture, the required rate of development is
25%. See NEW HOPE OFTHE YELLOW EARTH, supra note 18, at 20.
53. See DOCUMENT #15, supra note 20, at 3.
54. See id.
55. See id. at 4.
56. Tax benefits vary from county to county. Counties in Luliang exempt wasteland
[Vol. 19:545552
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day that they spend developing their wasteland from their obliga-
tory community labor contribution 57 on a one-to-one ratio. Agri-
cultural sidelines and food processing businesses developed on
wasteland are exempt from income taxes for fifteen years.5 Some
counties also pay direct subsidies to contractors for developing
wasteland.59
Contractors pay for wasteland use rights in either a lump sum
payment or installments. 6° The villagers' conference decides which
payment method to use based on the resources of potential bidders
and the desirability of the land. For poor people, a village may
choose to require payment only after the contractor realizes a re-
turn on wasteland development.6 Villages often use the proceeds
from the sale of wasteland use rights to reward contractors who
have effectively developed wasteland.
d. Wasteland Disputes
Disputes are divided into two categories and pass through two
administrative systems. Non-land economic disputes, such as
those involving the cutting of existing trees on wasteland, are first
subject to arbitration at the township agricultural economic man-
agement station. These disputes subsequently proceed to the
county agricultural economic management bureau for final arbi-
tration.
Conversely, land disputes are first handled by the township
land manager who is a government employee.62 If the parties can-
not resolve the land dispute at that stage, they may take the case to
from taxes and fees for 8 to 20 years. See NEW HOPE OF THE YELLOW EARTH, supra
note 18, at 251.
57. In addition to making annual financial contributions to the collective, Chinese
farmers are required to work for a specified number of days on community projects, such
as irrigation maintenance, road repair, or school expansion. Each laborer must work
from 5 to 30 days per year.
58. See DOCUMENT #15, supra note 20, at 4.
59. For example, bidders in Shilou County are paid 30 yuan, 5 yuan, and 3 yuan for
each developed mu of farmland, forest land, and grassland, respectively. See NEW HOPE
OF THE YELLOW EARTH, supra note 18, at 78.
60. See DOCUMENT #14, supra note 18, at 7.
61. We found sharecropping arrangements in one village where wasteland was of-
fered to all villagers at set terms, but we did not find similar arrangements with auctioned
wasteland. See id.
62. See DOCUMENT #22, supra note 48, at 16.
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the county's land management bureau for. arbitration.63 If either
party is dissatisfied with the outcome of the bureau's arbitration,
they may file a lawsuit in the People's Court at the county level.
64
That decision may be appealed to the prefecture's intermediate
65court for a final ruling.
II. FIELDWORK FINDINGS
A. Methodology
Our fieldwork in Shanxi Province was part of our fifth round
of fieldwork in the PRC that focused on the rural land system. We
interviewed a total of thirty-four farmers, including twenty-one
wasteland contractors and four farmers who unsuccessfully bid for
wasteland. We conducted all of the wasteland farmer interviews in
four Luliang counties.
We used Rapid Rural Appraisal methods in our fieldwork.66
These methods allow interviewees to actively participate in the
semi-structured interview process. Our questions were based on a
checklist of issues. We occasionally failed to address all the issues
in one interview and sometimes departed from the basic questions
to pursue interesting, unexpected, or new information.
Although the prefecture government allows non-farmers to
bid for wasteland, only one of the twenty-one wasteland contrac-
tors we interviewed had not previously been a farmer. The largest
landholder contracted for 500 mu (33.3 hectares),67 while the
smallest landholder contracted for only 5 mu (0.3 hectares). The
average wasteland holding was about 91 mu (6.1 hectares) per
household, though we learned that some large landholders had




66. For a discussion of Rural Rapid Appraisal, see Robert Chambers, Shortcut Meth-
ods of Gathering Social Information for Rural Development Projects, in PUTTING PEOPLE
FIRST: SOCIOLOGICAL VARIABLES IN RURAL DEVELOPMENT 399, 399-400 (Michael M.
Cernea ed., 1991).
67. Fifteen mu equals one hectare.
68. A farm family of seven brothers in Lishi County purchased 50-year use rights to
10,000 mu (666.7 hectares) of wasteland in their village. See NEW HOPE OF THE YELLOW
EARTH, supra note 18, at 26.
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B. Wasteland Distribution Process
Although Luliang's experiment in distributing wasteland was
called a wasteland auction, we found that Luliang distrubuted
much of its wasteland through non-auction methods. 9 Among the
twenty-one contractors we interviewed, only ten obtained their
wasteland through competitive auctions, all of which were closed
auctions limited to village.residents. The remaining eleven inter-
viewees obtained wasteland through a non-competitive distribu-
tion process on terms set by the brigade.
The competitive auction process described by the contractors
we interviewed was very similar to that described by prefecture
officials. All interviewees said they learned about the auction
approximately one month prior to the auction date through wired
broadcasting or the village bulletin board. The information in-
cluded a description of parcels to be auctioned and their starting
bids. Brigade leaders, with assistance from the township govern-
ment, organized and administered the auctions. Although elected
villager representatives were part of auction leading groups, six
farmers in Zhongyang County reported that most representatives
in their village were former brigade leaders.
The ratio of successful bidders to the total number of auction
participants, as well as the difference between starting and pur-
chase prices, indicate that these auctions were competitive. Nearly
all successful bidders we interviewed paid a purchase price at least
three times higher than the starting bid. We found the greatest dif-
ference between starting and purchase prices in the most recent
auction conducted during the spring of 1995. This suggests growing
competitiveness due to greater interest in, and better awareness of,
wasteland auctions.
2. Non-Competitive Distribution of Wasteland in Luliang
In addition to competitive auctions, we found three basic
methods of non-competitive wasteland distribution in Luliang. In
the first method, which we witnessed in two villages, the brigade
distributed wasteland to all households in the early 1980s - the
69. Prefecture officials told us that, of one million mu of wasteland distributed thus
far, 35% was through closed auctions, 15% through open auctions, and 50% through ne-
gotiated sales without auctions.
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same time arable land was initially distributed. The households
did not pay for rights to wasteland and did not feel confident in
their rights to this wasteland. As a result, most did nothing to de-
velop the wasteland.
In the second method, the brigade offered specific parcels of
wasteland to all village residents at a price predetermined by bri-
gade cadres and villager representatives. If more than one house-
hold was interested in the same parcel, the brigade divided the
parcel among all households willing to buy it.
The third method of non-competitive wasteland distribution
involved a situation where the brigade had previously contracted
wasteland to a farmer, perhaps in the early 1980s, and was now
making a more determined effort to provide long-term security on
the wasteland. In this specific situation, the village auctioned pre-
viously unavailable fifty-year rights to wasteland. For the previ-
ously contracted wasteland, however, the brigade offered a fifty-
year extension at a price considerably lower than the starting bid
price for other wasteland parcels.
C. Price and Payment Terms
Nearly all farmers who acquired wasteland rights in competi-
tive auctions purchased the use rights at a price much higher than
the starting bid. Most paid a price three to six times higher than
the starting price. The only exceptions were two brigade leaders;
one bid successfully by offering the starting price and the other bid
successfully by offering slightly above the starting price.7" The
price for wasteland ranged from one to thirty-five yuan per mu,
depending on land quality, the length of use rights, and the acqui-
sition date of the rights. In at least one village, the wasteland price
increased more than tenfold over the past two years.
Most farmers, except one who paid in two installments, paid
cash in a lump sum for wasteland use rights, even though prefec-
ture government policies permit multiple payment methods.7 The
70. We found these two cases in different counties. One possible explanation for why
the two brigade leaders successfully bid for wasteland at essentially the starting price is
that rank-and-file farmers did not bid against the brigade leaders.
71. "Payment [for use rights to wasteland] can be made in lump sum or installments,
depending on the decision made by villagers through discussions." DOCUMENT #15, supra
note 20, at 3.
[Vol. 19:545556
Land Reform in China
prefecture's requirement of a lump sum payment discouraged
many poor farmers from bidding even though they were otherwise
capable of developing it. Almost all farmers we interviewed who
did not participate in auctions, or participated unsuccessfully, cited
lack of financial resources as one of the major reasons for their
being unable to make successful bids on wasteland.
Some farmers paid for use rights through sharecropping ar-
rangements with the brigade. We interviewed a group of six farm-
ers in the prefecture's Jiaocheng County who entered into share-
cropping arrangements with the brigade." Share cropping terms,
which were set by the brigade, varied depending on land quality
and the date of acquisition of the rights. Farmers could retain sixty
to eighty percent of the income from the contracted wasteland
paying the remainder to the brigade.
D. Length of Use Rights
Although prefecture officials told us that the length of use
rights to auctioned wasteland varied from 50 to 100 years, the ex-
amples we found in the field ranged from 30 to 60 years. The
most common term was 50 years. In the 1980's, before the auction
process was introduced, use rights for the wasteland distributed to
farmers were much shorter, ranging only from 15 to 30 years.
The farmers we interviewed were aware of the specific length
of their wasteland use rights. When asked about the length of
their use rights, most farmers confirmed the term stated in their
land contracts. These responses contrast sharply with our previous
field experience with arable land farmers in other regions of the
PRC. In previous fieldwork, when asked the length of their use
rights, a large majority of farmers answered, "I do not know."
Most of these farmers did not have written land use contracts. The
difference may be due to the fact that all wasteland contractors in-
terviewed in the present study possessed both written land use
contracts and certificates that were clear and definite about the
term period. Interestingly, when asked about the length of use
rights to their arable land, more than half of the wasteland con-
72. Ihterestingly, however, these farmers received their wasteland through land dis-
tribution rather than land auctions before the prefecture-wide auction program started in
1992. The term periods for their contracted wasteland, which ranged from 15 to 30 years,
were much shorter than those for auctioned wasteland.
19971 557
Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L.J.
tractors interviewed in Luliang Prefecture responded, "I do not
know."73
E. Land Use Contracts and Certificates
As in previous rounds of fieldwork, we asked interviewees
about their land contracts. In our previous fieldwork in other re-
gions of the PRC, we found that most farmers did not have written
land use contracts. In Luliang, however, we found that almost
every wasteland contractor possessed both a written land use con-
tract with the brigade and a land certificate issued by the county
government. Both documents are more sophisticated than most
land documents we have witnessed during previous fieldwork.
They state a specific term period, provide a detailed description of
rights and obligations of both parties, list rewards for honoring
contract terms, and enumerate penalties for violations.
The combination of wasteland use contracts and land certifi-
cates produced by six farmers in Zhongyang County in Luliang is
an interesting example. We found that both the land use contract
and land certificate were designed and printed in a uniform format
throughout the county. In addition, the contracts commencing in
1994 were slightly improved from previous contracts, indicating a
trend of periodic refinement of the uniform contracts.
1. Land Contract
The wasteland use contract, entitled "Contract of Use Rights
to Auctioned Four Wastes," is a nine-page document, consisting
of three basic portions: (1) term period, rights and obligations of
both parties, and rewards and penalties; (2) land description and
wasteland development requirements; and (3) notarization. The
first portion consists of ten sections:
(1) Signature date of contract, numerical order of the con-
tract and notarization, name of contract issuer or brigade, name of
contractor, and purpose of wasteland auction.
(2) Parcel(s), acreage and location (the land is further de-
scribed in the second portion of the contract).
73. Many farmers in Luliang-do not have written land contracts or land certificates
for their arable land. In addition, even on the few occasions where farmers actually had
an arable, land contract, the term period was left blank-a common phenomenon in other
parts of the PRC.
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(3) Term period: The term period is from year (number) to
year (number). Upon expiration, the contractor can continue to
use the land after "paying compensation."
(4) Rights and obligations of Party A (contract issuer)
A. Party A has the right to make technical criteria for "four
waste" development and to enforce those rules.
B. In addition to incentive measures offered by upper levels of
government, Party A may create its own incentives to motivate
Party B to make land development.
C. Party A shall make village rules that forbid infringement of
Party B's interests in his contracted "four wastes," such as herding
animals, cutting trees and picking up firewood within Party B's
contracted "four wastes."
D. Party A must work together with the related departments
of government to make a general wasteland development plan and
monitor implementation of the plan.
(5) Rights and obligations of Party B (contractor)
A. Party B must complete land registration and obtain "four
wastes" land certificate after making full payment for use rights to
the land.
B. The "four wastes" rights contracted by Party B are allowed
to pass by inheritance, transfer or sale. If Party B needs to transfer
his "four wastes" rights to others due to some unusual reasons
(unspecified), he must be compensated at a reasonable rate for his
investment and immovable assets on the land.
C. Party B has the right to build residential houses, small ag-
ricultural farms, small forest farms, small animal husbandry farms
and businesses for processing agricultural or sideline products on
the contracted "four wastes." Party B shall not engage in any non-
agricultural businesses on his "four wastes" unless Party A ap-
proves, both parties sign a new contract, Party B's payment is ad-
justed, and registration is made.
D. Returns on development of the "four wastes" generally
belong to Party B. For the wasteland of good quality and situated
at (blank), both parties shall share the returns at the ratio of
(blank).
E. The "four wastes" shall be exempt from agricultural spe-
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cialty tax for ten years. They shall be exempt from quota and con-
tribution to the collective and agricultural tax for ten years74 after
being developed into basic farmland. The period of the exemption
shall be calculated from the date the returns on development are
realized.75
F. On the contracted wasteland, Party B is not allowed to: (1)
destroy forest and grass; (2) reclaim land for planting annual
crops;" (3) damage already existing transportation and irrigation
facilities; (4) cut trees at will; or (5) build large or medium size
dams without approval.
G. Party B must meet the "Requirements for the Develop-
ment of Contracted 'Four Wastes"' detailed in the second part of
the contract, according to the general development plans and
technical procedures for "four wastes" development formulated by
Party A.
(6) Rewards and Penalties:
A. Party B shall make all payments within (numbered) days
after signing the contract. Party A has the right to revoke the con-
tract and ask for compensation if all or part of payment is past due.
B. Party A has the right to claim the land back for re-auction
if Party B fails to honor the contract, fails to meet the require-
ments for "four waste" development, or violates the requirement
for "five don'ts" (detailed in section F of article 5).
C. Party A shall render spiritual and material rewards to
Party B if Party B makes remarkable improvements on wasteland.
D. Party B has the right to revoke the contract and ask for
compensation if Party A fails to deliver to Party B use rights to
"four wastes" according to the contract. If Party A intercepts all
or part of the funding, materials and loans allocated by upper lev-
els of government for "four wastes" development, it shall be penal-
ized by paying Party B (blank) percent of the amount it has inter-
74. The 1993 version of the contract provided a 20-year exemption. See NEW HOPE
OF THE YELLOW EARTH, supra note 18, at 251.
75. This sentence was not in the 1993 version of the contract. See id.
76. This rule seems inconsistent with article E of the contract, which appears to allow
contractors to develop wasteland into "basic farmland." Of the wasteland contractors
whom we interviewed, many planted annual crops among fruit trees, but a few planted
annual crops only on certain portions of their wasteland that were level or had been ter-
raced.
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cepted in addition to all the amount it has intercepted.
(7) Irresistible Force: If Party B fails to honor the contract
terms concerning improvement requirements in a timely fashion
due to irresistible natural disasters, some lenience is allowed upon
verification.
(8) Arbitration Agreement: When a dispute occurs during
the implementation of the contract and cannot be solved by the
parties, either party may appeal to the relevant township rural
economic management station for mediation. If any party is not
satisfied with mediation results, the case may be filed at the
county rural economic management bureau for arbitration.
(9) Other: This contract goes into effect from the date it is
signed by both parties. It is protected by the state laws. No party
is allowed to change or terminate the contract within the term pe-
riod of the contract. No institution or individual is allowed to
sabotage the interests of the contractor. Additional terms may be
made to the contract through negotiation between the two parties,
if needed. The additions and the contract shall have the same ef-
fect.
(10) Additions: [Blank]
This contract has four copies, with each kept by Party A,
Party B, the notary of the contract and the issuer of the land cer-
tificate.
Party A: (Name of Brigade) (Seal of Brigade)
Representative: (Signature) (Personal Seal)
Party B: Representative: (Signature) (Personal Seal)
Date:
The second portion of the wasteland use contract consists of
two parts. The first part describes the wasteland, specifically stat-
ing its name, acreage and location. The first part also shows the
amount, date, and method of payment. The second part details the
criteria of development measured by percentage of land improve-
ment and amount of yields achieved each year from Year One to
Year Seven. The contractor must develop eighty-five percent of
77. Article 8 was added in the 1994 version of the contract. See NEW HOPE OF THE
YELLOW EARTH, supra note 18, at 251.
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the wasteland he contracts before Year Seven.
The third portion of the contract is the contract notarization.
We saw a few notarized land contracts in other regions of the
PRC. The notarization portion is as follows:
Zhongyang County Rural Economic Management Bureau
Notarization
(Named) Township Rural Economic Management Station No-
tarization Serial Number (blank)
This is to certify that the Contract of Use Rights to Auctioned
"Four Wastes" signed by the Village Committee of (named
village), the seller, and (name) of (named village), the contrac-
tor, is complete in contract terms, reasonable in land develop-
ment criteria, clear and understandable in language description,
and legal in content. This is also to certify that the identities,
signatures and seals of the representatives of both parties are
true.




The "Four Wastes" Land Use Certificate is another important
document that helps strengthen farmers' security on wasteland. It
is a six-page document, issued and sealed by the county people's
government and the county land management bureau. The certifi-
cate states the user's name, land category, a brief description of
land location, size of the land, term period of use rights, and use
purpose of the land. It also contains the following regulations:
1. The land use rights registered in this certificate are pro-
tected by the state laws from violations by any institution or indi-
vidual.
2. The use rights registered in this certificate are effective
within the stated term period. The use rights may pass by inheri-
tance, transfer, lease, and gift to other people, but any of these
transactions must go through transfer procedures.
. 3. Land users must abide by the state laws on land, water con-
servation, forests and grassland, and manage the land according to
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contract terms.
4. The land use rights shall be taken from the user if the user
violates laws and regulations, or fails to honor contract terms.
5. The land use rights may be subject to change upon the ex-
piration of the certificate.8
6. Management' of the land shall be monitored by depart-
ments in charge of water resource management and forests.
When compared to the documentation practices for arable
land we have seen in other regions of the PRC, we found that the
documentation of use rights to wasteland in Luliang Prefecture has
at least four unique features. First, both the land contract and land
certificate are uniform in format and language throughout the
county. Second, the county's land management bureau issues the
land certificate," which bears the seal of county people's govern-
ment. Third, the term period of use rights is clearly printed on
both documents and finally, notarization is an indispensable part
of the land contract.
F. Other Contract Rights and Obligations
Both the written land contract and the prefecture regulations
require wasteland contractors to develop the wasteland in a certain
manner, to a certain degree, and within a certain period of time. If
the contractor fails to meet these requirements, the brigade can
take back the land without compensation.
All wasteland contractors reported that unless the sloped land
was terraced," they were required to grow trees or grass on waste-
78. This article appears inconsistent with article 3 of the Contract of Use Rights to
Auctioned "Four Wastes," which states: "Upon expiration, the contractor can continue to
use the land after paying compensation." It is also inconsistent with the prefecture regu-
lations, which provide: "The buyer [contractor] can continue to use the land with compen-
sation upon the expiration [of the contract]." DOCUMENT #15, supra note 20, at 3. Nei-
ther the contract nor the document, however, explicitly provide for the level of
compensation or the length of the extended use.
79. The Law of the People's Republic of China on Land Management does not assign
this task to county level land management departments. It simply provides that "[t]he
right to legal use of State owned land by units owned by the whole people, collectively
o'vned units or individuals shall be subject to... the issu[ance] of a certificate by the local
people's government at county or higher level." Law of the People's Republic of China
on Land Management art. 9, translated in 2 CHINA L. FOREIGN Bus. (CCH) 9 14,715(9)
(June 25, 1986) [hereinafter Land Management Law].
80. Many farmers intercropped annual crops with trees on sloped land.
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land that was sloped." Most wasteland contractors also reported
that the brigade required more development than called for .under
the explicit terms of either the contract or prefecture regulations.
For example, six farmers in Zhongyang County told us that they
were required to develop eighty-five percent of the wasteland
within three years. Their written contracts, however, required only
forty-five percent development by the third year; further, prefec-
ture guidelines require only thirty percent development by the
82third year.
The farmers knew their wasteland rights may be inherited and
that their use rights were transferable in principle, but only some
realized that they could transfer their rights only after developing
a required percentage of the land. The absence of specific terms
concerning transfer requirements in the land contract may be the.
cause of farmers' ignorance of their transfer rights.
G. Extent of Wasteland Development
Most farmers we interviewed made or were making substan-
tial investments of cash and labor on their wasteland. This was
striking for one of the poorest areas in the PRC where the annual
income per capita is only 735 yuan.
All twenty-one wasteland contractors we interviewed re-
ported that they spent most or all of their time on wasteland de-
velopment and management. When asked how much time they
spent on their wasteland, a typical answer was "every day." Six-
teen of the twenty-one contractors made cash investments in
wasteland development. Among them, six contractors spent more
than 100 yuan per mu. The interviewee making the largest cash
investment had invested 500 yuan per mu on 35 mu of his waste-
land. He also planned to spend another 30,000 yuan on the re-
maining 100 mu with income from selling fruits currently grown on
81. Sloped land is usually defined as land with a slope of 25 degrees or more. See
NEW HOPE OF THE YELLOW EARTH, supra note 18, at 20.
82. The written contract, which is uniform throughout the county, requires that the
contractor complete 85% development within seven years of the date that the land is con-
tracted. Although the prefecture government does not have explicit regulations requiring
the achievement of a specific development rate by a given date, article 10 of Document
Number 22 of 1994, which the Luliang Prefecture Committee of CCP issued, states, "The
collective may take the contracted wasteland back if it is developed less than 30 percent,
or not development at all, within three years." See DOCUMENT #22, supra note 48, at 16.
564 [Vol. 19:545.
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his improved land. Because each of these contractors had up to
hundreds of mu of wasteland, cash investment per household
reached tens of thousands of yuan, a scale we have never witnessed
in other parts of the PRC. All farmers expected returns of at least
ten times greater than their investments.
Nearly all of the wasteland contractors we interviewed were
primarily planting trees for fruit, nuts, or timber. 3 Contractors
used the cash investments in wasteland development for leasing
land reclamation equipment, hiring outside labor, and buying
young trees. Most farmers solved their financial needs by deplet-
ing their savings and borrowing money from relatives. Few ob-
tained bank loans, but most reported that they lacked access to
bank credit.
We also asked seven of the twenty-one wasteland farmers
about long-term investments on their arable land. Six of the farm-
ers made no such investments on their arable land. When asked
why he spent 2,000 yuan on 15 mu of his wasteland one farmer
said, "because arable land is readjusted all the time." 84 All six of
these farmers reported that they either did not have written arable
land contracts or that the brigade periodically readjusted their ar-
able land.
83. Of the 21 wasteland contractors whom we interviewed, only one was not planting
timber, nut, or fruit trees as a primary crop.
84. In response to demographic change an egalitarian distribution of arable land con-
tinues to be emphasized in most Chinese villages through a process of land readjustments.
Such readjustments are designed to maintain the egalitarian distribution of land within
the village as the village population changes. Two general types of readjustments occur:
"small" readjustments and "big" readjustments.
"Small" readjustments consist of adding to or taking away from a household's
existing landholding when the household size changes. See PROSTERMAN ET AL., supra
note 5, at 30. Small readjustments may take place on a continuing basis as the household
size changes, or every few years to reflect changes in the intervening years. See id. In
either case, households that remain the same size will continue to farm the same land-
holding.
"Big" readjustments involve an overall change in all households' landholdings.
See id. All the farmland in the village is returned to the collective management and real-
located among village households. As a result, each household receives an entirely dif-
ferent parcel of land. Big readjustments generally occur every three to six years. In big
readjustments, even households that have not added or lost members will receive an en-
tirely new landholding. Some villages undergo both periodic big readjustments and con-
tinuing small readjustments.
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III. RECOMMENDATIONS
The PRC has a small and shrinking base of cultivated land.
Yet, the country has at least thirty-three million hectares of unde-
veloped, but cultivable wasteland. 5 Formulating a successful
model of wasteland development in the PRC could have a tre-
mendous impact on its agricultural economy.
Luliang's experience with auctioning and selling use rights to
wasteland is a starting point for wasteland distribution in the PRC.
Building on the many positive initiatives by Luliang in wasteland
distribution, we offer twelve recommendations for promoting an
equitable and economically efficient method of promoting waste-
land development in the PRC. Our recommendations fall under
four main areas: (1) access to wasteland for all farmers, regardless
of income; (2) secure use rights to wasteland; (3) facilitating trans-
fers of wasteland rights; and (4) access to credit for wasteland de-
velopment.
A. Increasing Access to Wasteland
Villages introduced competitive auctions for wasteland use
rights to depart from patterns of egalitarian land distribution.
Through our fieldwork and exchanges with Chinese officials, we
found that the inequality in the distribution of wasteland and the
resulting income may pose a social problem when wasteland de-
velopment begins to generate more revenue. Although we do not
recommend sacrificing the market mechanism for egalitarian fal-
lacy, improvements to current methods of wasteland distribution,
payment arrangements, and income distribution may minimize the
inequality and maximize the number of wasteland contractors. In
addition to serving agricultural and environmental objectives,
wasteland distribution and development should address poverty
alleviation in the PRC's poorer regions.
Recommendation No. 1: Increased use of Closed Auctions Rather
than Open Auctions in Poor Villages
All of the poor villages we visited in Luliang conducted closed
auctions that limited participation to village residents. Prefecture
officials reported that a village would open the auction to outsiders
85. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
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only if the closed auction failed to attract the interest of village
residents. This is a sensible policy. Opening auctions in poor vil-
lages to outsiders would likely attract wealthy non-residents with
whom the village residents would not be able to compete. This
would lead to a concentration of landholding among non-residents
and a potentially unstable social situation, especially in poor areas
where wasteland is prevalent. To avoid these harmful situations,
the untapped wealth and potential in the wasteland should be of-
fered first to area residents who generally have limited opportuni-
ties for financial betterment.
Recommendation No. 2: Land Ceilings on the Amount of
Wasteland per Family
Currently, no limit exists on the amount of wasteland one per-
son or household can hold. We learned that some households
have contracted as much as 10,000 mu of wasteland through auc-
tions.86 The absence of limits on the amount of land per household
may intensify the inequality between farmers with financial re-
sources and those without. This may lead to the reappearance of
big landlords and the polarization of wealth. We recommend that
each province or prefecture set specific land ceilings for use rights
to "four wastes.,
87
Recommendation No. 3: Emphasizing Public Education About
the Auction Process
Most villages we visited in Luliang succeeded in informing
and educating village residents about the wasteland auction proc-
ess well in advance of the auction. To encourage widespread and
informed participation, comprehensive information about all
wasteland parcels to be auctioned, including the rights and obliga-
tions of wasteland contractors, and the bidding process should be
made available in the village at least thirty days before the auction.
For open auctions, such information should be published in the
86. The Land Management Law requires State Land Administration Bureau ap-
proval for the development of wasteland with an area of between 10,000 and 20,000 mu.
See Land Management Law, supra note 79, art. 13, translated in 2 CHINA L. FOREIGN
Bus. (CCH) 1 14,715(13) (June 25, 1986).
87. Administering land ceilings will require a basic land registration system. See infra
Recommendation No. 11.
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media available to local residents. The more farmers are educated
about the auction process, the more likely they will participate.
Recommendation No. 4: Alternative Methods of Payment
Most villages that conduct wasteland auctions require success-
ful bidders to pay for their use rights in one. lump sum after the
auction." This requirement limits wasteland accessibility to farm-
ers who have immediate access to significant amounts of cash.
Several farmers we interviewed desired use rights to wasteland but
lacked the financial resources necessary to obtain and develop the
land. Villages conducting auctions should make wider use of in-
stallment payments and sharecropping terms to make wasteland
purchase and development affordable to poorer farmers.
a. Installments
Even though Luliang rules permit contractors to pay for
wasteland use rights in installments, 9 installment payments are
rarely used in practice. Possible reasons include: (1) the prefec-
ture government authorizes the brigade villagers' conference to
choose a payment method, ° which makes it possible for brigade
cadre to manipulate the conference into adopting a lump sum
payment method; and (2) farmers are not aware that installment
payments are permissible.
Installment payments for wasteland would encourage many
farmers who presently lack adequate financial resources to partici-
pate in the auction process. Because many farmers are unaware
that 'installment programs are acceptable, villages should also in-
crease awareness about this payment method.
b. Sharecropping
Two of the villages we visited established sharecropping terms
with wasteland contractors. Although the terms varied, farmers
typically paid the village twenty to forty percent of the gross in-
come from the land. Although sharecropping arrangements are
highly skewed against the sharecropper in many parts of the world,
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we recommend the use of regulated sharecropping arrangements
for wasteland contracting in the PRC. Sharecropping arrange-
ments, like installment payments, make wasteland contracting
more affordable to a greater number of farmers. Moreover, share-
cropping agreements spread the risks (and benefits) of develop-
ment between the farmer and the collective owner, generally the
village, because payment depends upon results.
Villages may even try auctioning use rights to wasteland ac-
cording to bids based on the sharecropping terms. For example,
the village might use a sharecropping split of 15:85 (collective
owner:farmer) as a. starting bid. Farmers could bid for the waste-
land parcel by increasing the ratio, and the farmer willing to give
the collective owner the largest share of the gross income would be
the winning bidder.
In sum, we recommend that lump sum payment methods be
the exception rather than the rule. Policy and legal rules should
promote the use of installment payments and sharecropping ar-
rangements as methods to pay for wasteland rights. Both these
methods will make wasteland more accessible to more farmers.
Recommendation No. 5: Progressive Taxation of Wasteland
Income
Both policy designers and farmers expressed concern about
the polarization of wealth and the further discrepancy in income
between the rich and the poor. Some of this concern stems from
the unknown potential of wasteland. Those expressing concern
are worried that after contractors fully develop wasteland, the land
will generate substantial income for contractors who acquired it at
low prices. Some officials are even worried about the possibility
that the developed wasteland may be taken back under the pres-
sure from the low income people who do not have wasteland. We
recommend that, in addition to land ceilings and different payment
methods, moderately progressive taxes be used to facilitate redis-
tribution of wasteland income.
B. Providing Secure Use Rights to Wasteland
In order to have the incentives necessary to make the costly,
long-term investments to develop wasteland, farmers must possess
secure and long-term use rights to wasteland. Luliang has made
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substantial strides in providing such long-term and secure use
rights. Their efforts, however, are not enough. We have several
recommendations to refine the Luliang model.
Recommendation No. 6: Give Farmers Perpetual Use Rights
Luliang rules allow use rights ranging from 50 to 100 years for
wasteland. Most wasteland contractors we interviewed had 50-
year rights. Specific terms of 50 to 100 years are a significant im-
provement over the short and uncertain terms for arable land. We
recommend, however, that wasteland contractors be given perpet-
ual use rights. Over eighty percent of the farmers that we inter-
viewed favored perpetual use rights.9'
A 50 or 100-year term that is fully transferable and inheritable
might currently provide sufficient security to induce farmers to
make significant investments and induce banks to use the rights as
collateral. This, however, will not be true forever. First, within
approximately a decade,. inheritances and other transfers will in-
crease significantly. New land users will thus have a shorter lease
than their predecessors. As the expiration date draws closer,
farmers will have less incentive to make needed land improve-
ments. Second, as the length of the remaining term diminishes,
banks will be less willing to lend capital with the use rights as col-
lateral.
Recommendation No. 7: Clearer and More Detailed Wasteland
Contracts and Certificates
Luliang's system of documenting farmers' wasteland rights is
the most sophisticated and most effective system for land rights in
rural PRC.2 Our interviews in Luliang indicate the importance of
the written land documents in motivating farmers to make land
improvements.
No central government entity has designed or issued a stan-
dard wasteland contract form. We highly recommend that the
91. We did not consistently ask wasteland contractors in Luliang if they would prefer
perpetual use rights to their wasteland. We did, however, ask 12 of the wasteland farmers
in Luliang whether they would favor a policy of perpetual use rights to arable land; 10 of
12 responded favorably.
92. In our five rounds of fieldwork in the PRC, we found that most farmers do not
have written land contracts.
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Ministry of Agriculture's Department of Guidance to Rural Coop-
erative Economy design such a standard contract. Due to differing
and unique conditions, it may be impossible to use a single in-
flexible contract in all counties across the PRC. All contracts
throughout the country, however, should contain a description of
the contracted wasteland, a detailed list of the rights and duties of
both the collective owner and the wasteland contractor, the spe-
cific starting time and length of the use rights, payment terms or
sharecropping arrangements, wasteland development require-
ments, consequences of not meeting the development require-
ments, rules on transferring use rights and land takings, penalties
for contract violations, and land dispute resolution measures. A
representative of the farm household contracting the wasteland
and a representative of the landowner entity should sign the con-
tract. In addition, the highest possible government entity should
also sign and seal the contract.
Government issued land certificates should also accompany
the land contracts. Such certificates would facilitate the creation
of public land records. 93 Overall, clear and detailed land contracts
and certificates will secure use rights to wasteland and minimize
potential misunderstandings and disputes.
Recommedation No. 8: Clear Rules on Land Takings
Inadequacies of existing law and its lack of implementation
methods have contributed to widespread, uncompensated takings
of agricultural land by various government and collective entities.
Although most of the illegal, uncompensated takings we witnessed
involved arable land, there is evidence of at least one illegal and
uncompensated taking of wasteland in Luliang.94 Naturally, such
takings make farmers insecure and unsure about their rights. Un-
less the government controls such takings, farmers will not have
the land tenure security needed to promote wasteland develop-
93. See infra Recommendation No. 11.
94. A wasteland contractor in Jiaocheng County of Luliang told us that brigade offi-
cials uprooted trees on a portion of the land and subsequently sold the use rights to that
portion of his land to a private business developer. This illiterate farmer, in a rare exam-
ple of refusing to passively accept cadre misbehavior, filed a complaint with the CCP Sec-
retary of the County. After spending considerable time and money, the farmer eventually
regained the land. He did not, however, receive compensation for the uprooted trees.
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ment. Thus, the Chinese government should improve and imple-
ment legal procedures in order to empower wasteland contractors
and farmers with land rights. This would help balance the present
overwhelming power of land "takers."
We also recommend that the PRC only allow compulsory
takings for non-commercial public purposes such as roads or pub-
lic schools. In cases where the shift from agricultural use has been
lawfully approved, acquisitions for factories, brickyards, gasoline
stations, or other enterprises, must proceed only after the individ-
ual farmer has negotiated the sale, agrees to the terms, and the
owning entity approves the sale.
Rules limiting compulsory takings afid requiring substantial
compensation for the takings that do occur will serve two pur-
poses. First, these rules will enhance farmers' security of tenure
and consequently, motivate farmers to invest in agricultural im-
provements. Second, these rules will help protect the farmland
and forest land developed from wasteland, thus strengthening the
vital base of agricultural land upon which the PRC depends to feed
its people.
Recommendation No. 9: Improved Mechanisms for Land Dispute
Resolution.
The rights that government enactments or written contracts
formally grant to farmers mean nothing if they cannot enforce
these rights. Our fieldwork shows that farmers rarely perceive a
possibility of redress when local officials violate their land rights.
While several existing legal or mediation institutions are set up to
handle individual land disputes, we find that farmers do not use
these existing institutions when local cadre violate their rights.
Perhaps farmers fear that local cadre can control the dispute
resolution process. We recommend that the State Council estab-
lish and widely publicize significant penalties for specific violations
of wasteland contract rights by local cadre. Such penalties out-
lined in a State Council Directive would serve at least three pur-
poses: (1) to deter local cadre from violating farm households'
wasteland rights; (2) to provide tangible rules for dispute resolu-
tion institutions, such as mediation, arbitration, and adjudication
95. See DOCUMENT #22, supra note 48, at 16.
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agencies; and (3) to inform farmers that the government will penal-
ize local cadre for violating farmers' wasteland contract rights.
C. Facilitate Private Transfers of Wasteland Rights
The right to voluntarily transfer land is important for at least
four reasons. First, transferability facilitates allocation of land into
the hands of the most efficient user. British legal commentator
William Blackstone stated: "[I]t was found that what became in-
convenient or useless to one man, was highly convenient and use-
ful to another . . . Thus mutual convenience introduced com-
mercial traffic, and the reciprocal transfer of property by sale...
,,96 Second, a land user with the power to sell will adopt a longer
planning horizon and will more likely make improvements to the
land. For example, a farmer is more likely to terrace a waste slope
that he contracts and turn it into a farmland if he knows he can
capture some of the capitalized value of the terraced land's re-
maining net benefits after selling the land. Third, the right to
transfer is a prerequisite for the power to mortgage. The power to
create a mortgage, which is essentially a conditional promise to
transfer, may enable a farmer with little capital to acquire land or
obtain credit on favorable terms. Finally, the introduction of a
land market will give land a value and create the conditions for an
equitable and efficient land tax.
Luliang rules concerning the transfer of use rights are prudent
and strike a reasonable balance between facilitating private trans-
fers of wasteland rights and avoiding wasteland speculation. These
rules allow farmers to transfer wasteland rights to others for a
profit only after (1) holding the land for two years; and (2) improv-
ing and developing at least thirty percent of the land. We offer
two recommendations to further facilitate private transfers of
wasteland rights.
Recommedation No. 10: Land Transaction Regulations
The Land Management Law of the PRC provides that "[t]he
right to use State-owned or collectively owned land may be as-
signed, pursuant- to the law."97 Further, the State Council shall
96. 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *9.
97. Land Management Law, supra note 79, art 2, translated in 2 CHINA L. FOREIGN
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determine detailed measures for the transfer of land use rights in
separate legislation.9" The State Council has never promulgated
such detailed regulations. We recommend that the State Council
issue detailed regulations to govern rural land use transfers and
also issue an accompanying uniform land use transfer document to
guide parties who wish to transfer land use rights. The regulations
and the standard transfer document should include provisions gov-
erning land description, how and under what conditions the trans-
feror can take back the land, payment for land use, change of the
land use purpose, quota and burden responsibility, public registra-
tion of transfers, and resolution of disputes. Based on the experi-
ences of other countries, we have included a draft regulation on
land transfers. 99 We have also included a draft uniform land use
transfer document.00 The land transfer document may be used to
-transfer part or all of the transferor's rights within the remaining
contract period. Upon transfer, such regulations and a standard
transfer document should provide greater security to both trans-
ferors and transferees. With established procedures and forms,
farmers who wish to transfer land will have less need to rely only
on relatives or friends as transferees. The procedures and forms
will help provide the confidence currently sought in a trusted per-
sonal relationship. Also, parties engaged in a transfer of the entire
contract rights may well desire to have established procedures and
forms even in the context of a personal relationship of trust. Of
course, the government should widely publicize and disseminate
the regulations and the standard transfer document.
Recommendation No.11: Establishing a Public Land Records
System
Currently, some land use transfers are reported to the local
collective entity, which also keeps copies of any land contracts or
certificates; 1 most transfers, however, are not publicly recorded. If
Bus. (CCH) 14,715(2) (June 25, 1986).
98. See id., translated in 2 CHINA L. FOREIGN BUS. (CCH) 14,715(2) (June 25,
1986).
99. See infra Appendix 1.
100. See infra Appendix 2.
101. Although current rules require farmers to report land use transfers to the local
collective entity, we have found that few farmers actually report transfers. See
DOCUMENT #15, supra note 20, at 3.
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written land use contracts, and perhaps land certificates, are to be
issued to all farm households, copies of these certificates and con-
tracts should be maintained and organized at the local level. This
can provide the basis for a land registration system. The Rules for
the Implementation of the Law of the People's Republic of China
on Land Management specify that county level people's govern-
ments shall register collectively owned land."'' 2 If an active land
market is to develop, the PRC's rural areas will need a system of
land registration. Land registration systems exist in all countries
with efficient markets in land use rights. A land registration sys-
tem will help provide greater security to those who hold land, fa-
cilitate land transactions, provide market information to land mar-
ket participants, and provide tax and other information to local
administrative bodies.
A system of land registration should include the following
elements: (1) mapping of parcels to create a registry map; (2)
creation of a register of use rights, organized on a parcel basis,
summarizing all transactions and other transfers of rights affecting
the parcel and showing the current holder of the use right; and (3)
a parcel-based file system, indexed to the registry map, for deposit
of copies of relevant documents, such as transfers, designation of
heirs, and at some point in the future, mortgages. Most land regis-
tration systems in other countries provide that no transaction or
other transfer of land use rights is fully effective until it has been
registered. The costs associated with establishing a land registra-
tion system lie largely in the mapping. The level of accuracy af-
fordable is a key threshold decision in planning such a system.
D. Providing Access to Credit
Farmers in Luliang, as elsewhere in the PRC, generally lack
access to resources to finance their purchase of wasteland use
rights and their development of the wasteland. We interviewed
farmers who were unable to contract wasteland through the auc-
tion and all cited insufficient financial resources as the chief reason
for their unsuccessful bids. Several other farmers expressed con-
cern that even if they obtained wasteland they would be unable to
102. See Rules for the Implementation of the Law of the People's Republic of China
on Land Management art. 4, translated in 2 CHINA L. FOREIGN Bus. (CCH) 1 14,717(4)
(effective Feb. 1,1991).
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afford the substantial costs necessary to develop the wasteland.
Even some farmers who contracted wasteland stated they were
unable to fully develop the land because they lacked access to ad-
ditional financial resources.
Recommendation No. 12: Establishing Mortgage Rules and
Mechanisms
We recommend a mortgaging system using wasteland use
rights as collateral to secure the purchase and development of
wasteland. We believe banks may now be willing to take waste-
land use rights as property guarantee for loans, because (1) use
rights to wasteland are typically long term and secure; and (2) the
new PRC Guaranty Law explicitly allows the mortgaging of
wasteland use rights and contains needed legal rules to govern the
103process.
IV. CONCLUSION
The PRC has more than thirty million hectares of wasteland.
The development of this huge resource provides great potential for
meeting the increasing food demands of the PRC's growing popu-
lation, alleviating poverty in poorer regions of the PRC, reducing
soil erosion, and increasing forest coverage. Luliang's experience
with auctions and sales of use rights to wasteland indicates that
farmers are motivated to make long-term investments in land if
they are given long and secure rights to the land. Luliang's experi-
ence is also a useful model for wasteland distribution and devel-
opment. The PRC's policy designers would do well to study
Luliang's experience and make certain refinements aimed at (1)
increasing access to wasteland for all farmers, regardless of in-
103. The PRC Guaranty Law, which went into effect on October 1, 1995, explicitly
allows rights to "four wastes" to be used as collateral for loans. Guaranty Law art. 34(1)
(1995), reprinted in Guaranty Law, BBC SUMMARY WORLD BROADCASTS, July 24, 1995,
available in _LEXIS, News Library, Bbcwsb File. The Meitan County Land Systems Ex-
periment in Guizhou Province preliminarily attemped to create a mortgage market by
establishing a land bank, the Meitan Land Finance Company, for that purpose. The bank
was constrained, however, because there were no legal provisions for foreclosure. As a
result, the Land Finance Company could not make, mortgage loans directly to peasant
households, but was required to go through the administrative village. When we visited
Meitan in 1993, only 20 out of approximately 200,000 households in the county, were able
to use this mortgage right.
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come; (2) providing secure use rights to wasteland; (3) facilitating
transfers of wasteland rights; and (4) increasing access to credit for
wasteland development. By doing so, the PRC could develop an
effective national policy and legal infrastructure concerning
wasteland distribution and development.
Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L.J.
APPENDIX 1
DRAFT REGULATION
On Transfer of Use Rights to Collectively-Owned Land
1. This regulation shall be liberally construed and applied to
promote its underlying purposes and policies, which are:
(1) to simplify, clarify, and modernize the law governing trans-
fers of use rights to collectively-owned land;
(2) to strengthen the long-term security and certainty of use
rights to collectively-owned land;
(3) to promote voluntary transfers of use rights to collectively-
owned land to more efficient users;
(4) to protect both transferors and transferees of use rights to
collectively-owned land against practices that may cause unrea-
sonable risk and loss to them;
(5) to safeguard the socialist public ownership of land; and
(6) to facilitate establishment and improvement of the social-
ist market economy.
2. This regulation shall apply to transfers by natural or legal
persons of use rights to collectively-owned land, including transfers
by sale of the contract right, lease, gift, inheritance or other meth-
ods of transfer by which the holder of use rights to collectively-
owned land passes those rights to another natural or legal person.
3. Any natural or legal person who holds use rights to collec-
tively-owned land can transfer those rights subject to these regula-
tions.
4. Every right and duty described in this regulation shall be
performed and enforced in good faith.
5. A transfer of use rights to collectively-owned land may be
either compensated or uncompensated, depending on the decision
of the transferor and transferee. In case of a compensated trans-
fer, the amount of compensation for the transfer and the payment
conditions shall be determined by agreement between transferor
and transferee.
6. The term period for the transfer shall be determined by
agreement between transferor and transferee; but the term period
cannot be longer than the remaining term period of use rights held
by the transferor. If the transferor holds the right to renew his use
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rights to land for another term, he can transfer this right to the
transferee.
7. The transfer of use rights to collectively-owned land shall
be made by the use-right holder as the transferor to the transferee.
If the transfer is for more than one year, the parties to the transfer
shall record their agreement in a written Contract for the Transfer
of Use Rights to Collectively-Owned Land. The required form of
the Contract for the Transfer of Use Rights to Collectively-Owned
Land is attached as Appendix I to this regulation.
8. Transfer of use rights to collectively-owned land held by a
household shall require the written consent of the head of house-
hold and their spouse (if any). If the head of the household is a
minor or is otherwise incapacitated, the written consent of the
guardian is required. In such cases, the guardian may not be a
party to the transaction.
9. The Contract for the Transfer of Use Rights to Collec-
tively-Owned Land can be notarized in the notary office where the
land is located, although notarization is not required for the con-
tract to be valid. If seeking notarization, the transferor and trans-
feree shall present the following documents at the notary office:
a. Contract for the Transfer of Use Rights to Collectively-
Owned Land signed by the transferor and transferee; and
b. Document certifying the transferor's use rights to the col-
lectively-owned land.
10. The transfer does not require the approval of the entity
representing the collective land owner.
11. The transferor must provide two copies of the written
Contract for the Transfer of Use Rights to Collectively-Owned
Land to the entity representing the collective land owner. The en-
tity representing the collective land owner shall file one copy of
the Contract with the land administration office at the county level
and shall retain the other copy.
12 . The transferee may not change the use of the collec-
tively-owned land from agricultural to non-agricultural unless the
transferee obtains the necessary permission from the entity repre-
senting the collective owner and other permission required by the
Land Administration Law.
13. If the transferor transfers all his contract rights, the trans-
feree assumes all rights and duties of the transferor under the con-
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tract and the transferor no longer holds those rights or is liable for
the duties. The transferor will, however, continue to be liable for
any debts related to his land use incurred before the transfer.
14. The transferor shall continue to pay the taxes, crop quota,
and voluntary labor days associated with the use rights to the land
unless the Contract for the Transfer of Use Rights to Collectively-
Owned Land indicates otherwise or the transferor has transferred
all of his contract rights.
15. If either party. to a Contract for the Transfer of Use
Rights to Collectively Owned Land violates the contract, the other
party to the contract may seek redress at the local mediation or
arbitration office or may file suit directly with the local branch of
the county People's Court.
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APPENDIX 2
(Appendix 1 to Regulation on Transfer of Use Rights to Col-
lectively-Owned Land)
DRAFT
CONTRACT FOR THE TRANSFER OF USE RIGHTS
TO COLLECTIVELY-OWNED LAND
This contract shall be executed in four copies; one each for
the transferor, the transferee,
the entity representing the collective owner, and the local of-
fice of the Land Administration Agency.
The Transferor,





agrees to transfer, and
,represented
agrees to transfer-in,
g terms, the use rights to land described: as at-
S :
, located in (natural
village, administrative village, township, county, prefecture, and
province).
1. TRANSFEROR'S USE RIGHTS. The Transferor holds
valid use rights to the land being transferred. Those use rights are
reflected in
(name, date, and number of land use contract or other document),
which states that the Transferors use rights are for
years, beginning on the - day of __ , 19
2. TERMS. This agreement is for transfer: for a term of
months/years beginning on the - day of
19_; or of all of the transferor's rights to the land.
3. COMPENSATION. The transfer compensation is: a lump
sum payment of
periodic cash payments (_ per' 0 month Dyear 0 crop season
payable in advance on or before the __ of each 0 month 0
year 0 crop season); 0 in-kind (
per 0 year 0 crop season).
1997]
Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L.J.
4. SUBLETTING. The Transferee 0 can b cannot assign
or sublet their use rights to this land without the Transferor's writ-
ten consent.
5. BINDING ON HEIRS. The provisions of this transfer
shall be binding upon the heirs, successors, and representatives of
both transferor and transferee, except as provided by written mu-
tual agreement attached to this contract.
6. PAYMENT OF TAXES, FEES, CROP QUOTA, AND
COMPULSORY WORKDAYS. Responsibility for payment of
the various obligations associated with land is as follows:
Transferor Transferee Other
(specify)
Taxes and fees percent percent
Quota percent percent
Comp. Workdays percent percent
7. OPERATING EXPENSES. The Transferee agrees to
furnish all labor, machinery, and cash operating expenses associ-
ated with using the land.
The Transferee and Transferor agree to share the labor, ma-
chinery, and cash operating expenses as follows:
8. LAND USE. The land will be used for agricultural pur-
poses only. Proper authorization has been obtained to use the
land for non-agricultural purposes.
9. MAINTENANCE. If the land is to be used for agricul-
tural purposes, the transferee agrees to keep the land and water-
ways in good repair, to prevent deterioration and erosion of the
soil, not to erect permanent structures on the land without the con-
sent of the transferor, and not to cut live trees use unless planted
by the transferee.
10. DISPUTE RESOLUTION. Any differences between the
parties as to their rights or obligations under this transfer that are
not settled by mutual agreement after thorough discussion must be
submitted for mediation or arbitration before either party files suit
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in the local People's court.
Executed in four copies on the __ day of
(Transferor or representative) (Transferee or representative)
(Transferor's spouse) (Transferee's spouse)
Notarization (optional):

